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The Mink Case: Restoring the Freedom
Of Information Act

PATSY T. MINK*

Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink' presented the first
opportunity for the Supreme Court to interpret the Freedom of Information Act of 1966.2 The court had previously denied certiorari
to other cases. By its ruling in Mink, the court dealt such a severe
blow to the purposes of the Act that it might better be titled the
"Executive Secrecy Act."
The case stems from a large underground nuclear test the Atomic
Energy Commission sought to detonate in 1971 at Amchitka Island,
a small island in the Aleutian chain off Alaska. Isolated and remote, the island was deemed a suitable location for the blast which
was code-named "Cannikin". The Aleutians, however, are one of
the earth's most seismically active regions and have been the scene
of numerous natural earthquakes. The shifting of undersea land
masses in some past Aleutian earthquakes has touched off giant
waves called tsunamis that have raced thousands of miles across
the ocean's surface and caused loss of life and considerable property
* Member of Congress; elected to the 89th through 94th Congresses.

Hawaii, Second District. A.B., University of Hawaii, 1948. J.D., University
of Chicago, 1951; Member House Committees on Education and Labor, and
Interior and Insular Affairs.
1. 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (hereinafter cited as E.P.A. v. Mink).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
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damage in Hawaii. As a United States Representative responsible
for helping protect the people of Hawaii, I was greatly concerned
about the safety of this government action and feared that a nuclear
blast of such magnitude might cause a destructive tsunami.
My efforts to remove authority for the blast from the AEC authorization bill3 proved fruitless. I was preparing to offer an
amendment to the appropriation bill in order to delete funds for
Cannikin when a newspaper article 4 appeared quoting anonymous
sources as saying that five government agencies 5 had recommended
that Cannikin be either cancelled or postponed pending further
study. Immediate efforts were made by phone and by letter to
obtain copies of the reports criticizing the test 6 but to no avail. A
3. Two bills were proposed, H.R. REP. No. 9388, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) which was an AEC authorization bill, and H.R. REP. No. 10090, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) which was an AEC-Public Works appropriation bill.
Both bills were defeated in the House.

4. Wash. Evening Star, July 26, 1971, at B-10, Col. 1.
5. For varying reasons, the State Department, the Office of Science and
Technology, the United States Information Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Council of Environmental Quality recommended
postponement and cancellation. According to the same source, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission favored a go-ahead
of the test.
6. NOTE: According to the Supreme Court opinion in E.P.A. v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73 (1973), footnotes 3 and 4 at 76-79, the documents which comprised the report to the President known as the Irwin Affidavit were as follows:
A. A covering memorandum from Mr. Irwin to the President, dated
July 17, 1971. This memorandum is classified Top Secret pursuant to Executive Order 10501.
B. THE REPORT OF THE UNDER SEcRETAniEs COMMITTEE. This report
was also classified Top Secret. Attached to the report were additional documents.
1. A letter, classified Secret, from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to Mr. Irwin.
2. A report, classified Top Secret, from the Defense Program Review Committee, of which Dr. Henry Kissinger was the Chairman.

3.

The environmental impact statement on the proposed Cannikin
test, prepared by the AEC in 1971, pursuant to § 102 (c) of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 853, 42
U.S.C. § 4332(c). This document had always been "publicly

available" and a copy was attached to the Irwin Affidavit.
4.

A transcript of an oral briefing given by the AEC to the Com-

5.

A memorandum from the Council on Environmental Quality to
Mr. Irwin. This memorandum was separately unclassified.

mittee. This document was classified Secret.

letter signed by the counsel to the President stated that thie papers
"were prepared for the advice of the President and involve highly
sensitive matter that is vital to our national defense and foreign
policy. Therefore, I regret to inform you that they were not available for release."7 In the interim, I lost my second anti-Cannikin
amendment," and the test was ultimately conducted without apparent mishap on November 6, 1971. But on August 11 of that year,
Mink v. Environmental ProtectionAgency 9 was initiated in federal
court to secure release of the Cannikin Papers. The case continued
even after the detonation of the test and was destined to become
a sort of Waterloo of the Freedom of Information Act. 10
The Act was controversial at its adoption and remains so. It was
passed only after a number of prior attempts at such legislation
had failed. 1 The Act was adopted as an amendment to Section
C. In addition to the covering memorandum and the Committee's
report (with attached documents), were three letters that had
been transmitted to Mr. Irwin:
1. A letter from Mr. William Ruckelshaus, for the Environmental
Protection Agency. This letter was classified Top Secret, but
has now been declassified.

2. A letter from Mr.Russell Train, for the Council on Environmen-

tal Quality. Although the Irwin Affidavit states that this letter
was classified Top Secret, Petitioners concede that it was so
classified "only because it was to be attached to the Undersecretary's Report." Brief for Petitioners 6 n.5.
3. A letter of Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., for the Office of Science
and Technology. This letter is classified Top Secret.
These eight documents were also described as having been classified as "Restricted Data ... pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended. (42 U.S.C. 2014(y), 2161 and 2162.)"
Petitioners have not asserted that these provisions, standing

alone, would justify withholding the documents in this case.
But see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3), relating to matters "specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute."

7. Letters from John W. Dean, III, to Congresswoman Patsy Mink, August 2, 1971.
8. H.R. REP. No. 10090, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), defeated 108 to
275, on July 29, 1971.

9. (Hereinafter cited as Mink v. E.P.A.) Nom: The District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents in Civil No. 161471, U.S. District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed, 464 F.2d 742 (1972)
and remanded it to the District Court judge for reexamination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 405 U.S. 974 (1973), deciding in 410 U.S.
73 (1973).

10. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
11. For a legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act see
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 4, at 1367
(1972). H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972); For a discussion
of the background of the Act and related problems see Salomon and Wechsler, The Freedom of Information Act; a Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L.
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3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.12 That section contained the first general statutory provision for public disclosure of
executive branch rules, opinion and orders and public records, but
13
it was riddled with loopholes permitting government secrecy.
Unless otherwise provided by statute, it said:
"matters of official record shall in accordance with published rules
exbe made available to persons properly and directly concerned
14
cept information held confidential for good cause found."'
Moreover, the original Section 3 contained a blanket exclusion from
its applicability of any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the "public interest" and "any matter relating solely to
the internal management of an agency." 15
It was in the context of demonstrable federal agency abuses relating to "good cause," "public interest," and other loopholes that Congress passed the 1966 act.' 6 The measure adopted a policy that "any
person" should have clear access to identifiable agency records
without having to state a reason for wanting the information; it
placed upon the federal agency the burden of proving withholding
to be necessary. 17 Although President Johnson had been rumored
ready to veto the bill causing such a major change in government
information practices, he signed it into law on July 4, 1966. He
observed:
REV. 150 (1969); Engel, Information Disclosure Policies and Practices of
Federal Administrative Agencies, 68 N.W. U. L. REV. 184 (May/June 73)
The Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the Exceptions, 62
GEO. L. J. 177 (Oct. 73); The Freedom of Information Act: Shredding the
Paper Curtain, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 694 (May 73); The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-Agency Memorandum, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1047 (Apr. 73); National Environmental Policy Act, Freedom of Information Act and the Atomic Energy Commission: The Need for Environmental Information, 47 IND. L.J. 755 (S'72).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).

13. See generally Hearings on S. 1666, S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1966); H.R. REP. No.
1419, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1972).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
15. Id.

16. Freedom of Information Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. 552 (1966), 80 Stat.
250 and codified in its present form in 1967, 81 Stat. 54.
17. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1966). See also
Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (1973); Cunes v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086
(1973).

This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles:
a democracy works best when the people have all the information
that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to
pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed
without injury to the public interest . . . . I signed this measure
with a deep sense of pride that the United States is an open
society in which the people's right to know is cherished and
guarded.1 s

Withholding of information by the government under the Act is
permissive, not mandatory, and can primarily be justified on the
basis of the nine exemptions specified therein.' 9 The Mink20 case
involved judicial interpretation of only two of the nine exemptions,
but they are among the most important. One deals with information relating to national defense and foreign relations;;2 1 the other
permits exemption from compelled disclosure of inter-agency or in22
tra-agency decision making documents.18. Statement of President Johnson upon signing PUB. L. No. 89-487 on
July 4, 1966, in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (June 1967), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1972).
19. The exemptions of § 552(b) and (c) as used by the Court in its
opinion in E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 111 (1973) read as follows:
(b)
This section does not apply to matters that are(1)
specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in
the interest of national defense or foreign policy;
(2)
related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
(c) This section does not authorize withholding of information or
limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section. This section is not authority to
withhold information from Congress.
20. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
21. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (1) (1966). See also
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (1971); Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (1970);
Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318 (1973).
22. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (5) (1966). See also
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23
The fact that there have been more than 200 reported cases
involving the Act indicates that many problems regarding acceptable government information procedures still remain. These problems can be traced in part to the diversity of information collected
and retained by Executive Branch agencies. At the same time,
there have been disagreements as to the precise meaning of the

Freedom of Information Act. 24

Adding to the controversy sur-

rounding its passage are the two committee reports2 which have
been analyzed by the courts in an effort to determine the intent
of Congress. These reports differ in several significant respects. 2
Most observers conclude that the Senate report adopts an interpretation of the law more favorable to public disclosure of executive
agency information than the House report. The House report was
not before the Senate when it passed the Act on October 13, 1965,
but the Senate report was available in both houses (the House acted
on June 20,1966). For that reason, many courts and commentators
considering the Act have concluded that the Senate report merits
more weight in discussions seeking to interpret a specific pro27
vision of the Act.

The difficulty of finding legislative intent is not limited to the
Freedom of Information Act. 28

Much disagreement exists as to

whether legislative intent can be determined at all. The two quotations below point up the disparity of views:
Legislative history similarly affords in many instances accurate and
compelling guides to legislative meaning. Successive drafts of the
same act do not simply succeed each other as isolated phenomena,
International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (1971); American Mail Line
v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (1969).
23. See generally Salomon and Wechsler, The Freedom of Information
Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 150 (1969); Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions for Making Information Available
to the Public, 32 MD. L. Rgv. 189 (1972-73).
24. 5 U.S.C. 552 (1966). See Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines,
Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (1966).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1966); and S. REP. No.

813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965).
26. See Davis, The Information Act. A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm.
L. REV. 761 (1967). While the House did not change the bill itself, it wrote
restrictions into the committee report which resulted in substantial differ-

ences between that and the bill passed by the Senate.

27. See Salomon and Wechsler, Freedom of Information Act: A Critical
Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 150 (1969).

28. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).

but the substitution of one for another necessarily involves an
element of choice often leaving little doubt as to the reasons
governing such a choice. The voting down of an amendment or
its acceptance upon the statement of its proponent again may disclose real evidence of intent. Changes made in the light of earlier
statutes and their enforcement, acquiescence in a known administrative interpretation, the use of interpreted language borrowed
from other sources, all give evidence of a real and not fictitious
intent, and should be deemed to govern questions of construction. 29
To the contrary, another writer has stated:
[T] he legislative intent is an eliminable fiction. Experience amply
shows that the drafters or framers of a law, the committee that
reports it, the majority of the members of the two houses that, for
various reasons, pass it, and the executive that signs it are by no
means always agreed as to its meaning. Hence the rule that parliamentary debates are of no direct value in the interpretation of
statutes.3 0

Whatever the value of legislative history in interpreting a statute,
the Supreme Court decision in Mink appears to have determined,

at least with respect to two exemptions under the Act, that Congress by its adoption did not intend to promote freedom of information in areas of major importance which conflicted with executive
branch intent.3 ' Since the Act attempted to revise a previous disclosure statute3 2 which was deemed ineffective precisely because
it allowed too much executive discretion, it is difficult to see what
purpose Congress had in mind if not to reduce such discretion
rather than continue to expand it.
Action was brought because the plaintiffs, 33 members of Congress, felt the executive branch had exceeded the bounds of
statutory authority in refusing the request for the Cannikin Papers.
[The plaintiffs filed both as Congressmen and members of the
public. While the District Court ruled they lacked standing to sue
as Congressmen, this issue was not pursued or resolved.]
The
government's response to the filing of the suit was to move for summary judgment on the grounds that the materials sought were
specifically exempted from disclosure under subsections (b) (1) and
(b) (5) of the Act.3 3 At no time was a claim made of executive
privilege nor did the plaintiffs attempt to portray their case as a
"separation of powers" clash between the executive and legislative
29. Landis, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 886, 888 (1930).
30. M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 129 (1933).
31. The language of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1966), provides broad discretion to the executive branch in determining which materials are to be kept
secret. See Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board,
488 F.2d 710 (1973).
32. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1946).
33. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) and (5) (1966).
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branches of government. Both parties agreed that the case was
purely one involving interpretation of the statutory provisions of
84
the Freedom of Information Act.

In support of its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs, the government produced the affidavit of Mr. John N. Irwin
11,85 Under Secretary of State, which stated that Mr. Irwin had
been appointed by President Nixon as Chairman of an "Undersecretaries Committee" (part of the National Security Council System).
The Committee was directed by the President in 1969 "to review
the annual underground nuclear test program and to encompass
within this review requests for authorization of specific scheduled
tests."86 Pursuant to this request, Mr. Irwin said, the Committee
prepared and transmitted to the President a report on the proposed
Cannikin test. The papers consisted of the report itself, a covering
memorandum from Mr. Irwin, five documents attached to the report, and three letters separately sent to Mr. Irwin.3 7 Basically,
the documents were an evaluation of the safety of the test and the
comments of various executive agencies38 on the matter.
THE "NATIONAL

SEcuRITY" EXEMPTION

Matters that are "specifically required by Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" are

exempt from disclosure. 39

According to the government, except for an environmental impact
statement which was available to the public, the Cannikin Papers
were classified as Top Secret or Secret under Executive Order
10,501.40 Therefore, it contended, they were exempt from disclosure as "specifically required by executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy" as provided
by Section 552(b) (1) of the Freedom of Information Act.41
The District Court 42 granted summary judgment in favor of the
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
35. See supra, note 6.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.

39.
40.
41.
42.

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1).
Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 CFR 280.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1).
Mink v. E.P.A., Civil No. 1614-71, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D.C. Cir.).

government on the basis that the documents were exempt from disclosure as claimed. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
decision in a victory for the plaintiffs.48 rt concluded that subsection (b) (1) of the Act permitted the withholding of only the
secret portions of those documents bearing a separate classification
under the Executive order.
If the nonsecret components [of the documents) are separable from
the secret remainder and may be read separately
without distortion
44
of meaning, they too should be disclosed.

The court directed the district judge to examine the classified documents, "looking toward their possible separation for purposes of disclosure or non-disclosure.

' 45

Faced with the prospect of further court inquiry into its nondisclosure, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for
40
certiorari, which was granted.

The majority opinion of the Supreme Court by Justice White
(Burger, Stewart, Blackmun and Powell joining) concluded that
the exemption does not permit the disclosure of the six docu-

ments 47 which were separately classified.

Neither does it permit

inspection by a court (in camera) to sift out "so-called 'non-secret
components'." Citing both the House and Senate Reports 48 the
Court concluded that the only test permitted under this exemption
was whether the material had been classified by Executive Order.
According to the majority opinion, both the language of the exemption and the legislative history indicate that Congress did not intend
to subject security classifications by the executive to judicial

review. 49 It discussed the House Report 50 and remarks in the
Congressional Record by Representatives Moss and Gallagher, 51
and then went on to state that:
Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch
adopt new procedures [of classification] or it could have established its own procedures-subject only to whatever limitations the
Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such Congressional

43. Mink v. E.P.A., 464 F.2d 792 (1972).
44. Id. at 746.
45. Id. at 746.
46. E.P.A. v. Mink, cert. granted,405 U.S. 974 (1973).
47. See nn. 3 and 4, E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) for a list of documents and the manner in which they were classified.
48. H.R. REP. No. 1497. 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966); S. REP. No. 813,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
49. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 82 (1973).
50. Supra, note 48.
51. Hearings, Subcomm. on Government Operations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (remarks of Rep. Moss) 112
CONG. Rac. 1369 (remarks of Rep. Gallagher).
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ordering. But Exemption 1 does neither. It states with the utmost
"specifically required by
directness that the Act exempts matters
Executive order to be kept secret." 52
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stewart restates the conclusion of the majority that the language of the exemption precludes courts from examining documents classified by Executive
Order. "(I)n enacting Section 552(b) (1) Congress chose, instead,
to decree blind acceptance of executive fiat."5 3
Justice Brennan (Marshall joining) dissented from the majority
in its interpretation of Exemption 1. The language of the exemption provides that matters "specifically required by executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense
54
or foreign policy" can be exempt (emphasis Justice Brennan)
5
E.O. 10,501 5 is discussed at length, and some documents are found
to receive a security classification because of association with
other documents in a classified file. Presumably those documents alone are not "specifically required" to be kept secret under the Freedom of Information Act 56 but are merely classified by
being attached to other documents which are so required. The
opinion disagreed with the majority's reliance on the legislative
history as "erroneous and misleading".
The Douglas dissent5 7 does not discuss this exemption in any
detail; it relies instead on Sections 552 (a) (3) and 552 (c),59 which
are discussed later in this article.
It seems to this writer that the majority opinion went to ridiculous lengths to arrive at a fabricated interpretation of the Act.
Congress obviously had some purpose in enacting the law. The previous statute,5 9 hinging on a "public interest" standard, was discarded because those who held the information, namely the executive branch, had abused their discretion.6" The executive branch
by its actions had, in effect, defined the "public interest" according
E.P.A. v. Mink, 710 U.S. 73, 83 (1973).
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 CFR 280 (1970).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
E.P.A. v. Mink. 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973).
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1946).
60. See U.S. v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341 (1962).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

to what was deemed best for the government. It would be patently
absurd to replace this ineffective statute with another which permitted the executive branch to continue deciding according to its
own standards which material should be released to the public. The
fact that Congress acted at all indicates that it must have 'had some
other purpose.
If the majority opinion is to be accepted, Congress declared that
any document-for example, the Manhattan telephone directory
or the Encyclopedia Britannica-could be classified "Top Secret"
merely by being so stamped by any of the army of federal
employees authorized to classify documents under authority of the
general Executive Order. Justice Brennan's dissent points out the
error in presuming that an entire document containing information
on many "matters", some of which may be legitimately kept secret
and others which may not, can be classified in its entirety. 61 This
is a defect in the Executive Order-one which the government itself
has admitted by issuing a revised order,62 apparently based on the
Court of Appeals decision in the Mink case.
In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the government pointedly failed to challenge a portion of the Appeals Court
ruling which held:
This court sees no basis for withholding on security grounds a document that, although separately unclassified, is regarded secret
merely because it has been incorporated into a secret file. To the
extent that our position in this respect is inconsistent with the
above-quoted paragraph of Section 3 of Executive Order 10,501, we
deem it required by the terms and purpose of the [Freedom of Information Act], enacted subsequently to the Executive Order.S

The current Executive Order 64 prescribing the system for classification of security information was issued just two days after the
Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction in the Mink case.65 In an
effort to comply with the Act's mandate that genuinely secret
matters be carefully separated from non-secret components, section
4(a) of the new Order provides:
Documents in General .

.

. Each classified document shall .

.

. to

61. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 99 (1973), quoting lower court decision
in 464 F.2d 742, 746 (1972).
62. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 effective June 1, 1972, replaces Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 CFR 292 (1970), pursuant to the lower

court's decision in Mink v. E.P.A., 464 F.2d 742 (1972).

63. Mink v. E.P.A., 464 F.2d 742, 746 (1972). See also Justice Brennan's
dissent in E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 99, for a discussion of the lower court's

decision.

64. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972).
65. Cert. granted, 405 U.S. 974 (1973).
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the extent practicable, be so marked as to indicate what portions
are classified, at what level, and which portions are not classified
in order to facilitate exerpting and other use.66
President Nixon emphasized this requirement in his statement:
A major course of unnecessary classification under the old Executive order was the practical impossibility of discerning which
portions of a classified document actually required classification.
Incorporation of any material from a classified paper into another
document usually resulted in the classification of the new document, and innocuous portions of neither paper could be released.
[emphasis added] 67
Thus, the policy of the government now is that matters within
documents are to be classified, not the entire documents. Portions
which discuss unclassified matters may be released to the public.
Demonstrably, if the government could adopt such a policy after
the Court of Appeals decision in the Mink case, 68 it could have
done so before that decision. It could have done so all along in
consonance with the Freedom of Information Act.6 9 Unfortunately,
Within the terms of the Supreme Court majority opinion, 70 the
executive branch could conceivably reverse its practice and return
to the suppression of the old Executive Order. 71 That opinion
leaves the Supreme Court standing alone as the only branch of
government reaching such an extreme and undemocratic interpretation of the Act.
The major error made by the majority opinion was to confuse
documents with the matters they contain. 72 A document is not
a matter-matters are the subject of documents. Under the Act,
only matters may be exempt from compelled disclosure, 73 not entire
documents. The old Executive Order,74 which prescribed a procedure for classifying whole documents regardless of the non-sensitive nature of some portions, has been discarded. It is regrettable
66. Supra, note 64.
67. Supra, note 64.
68. Mink v. E.P.A., 464 F.2d 742 (1972).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
70. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
71. Exec. Order No 10,501, 3 CFR 292 (1970).
72. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973). Although 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(1) uses the word "matters," Justice White fails to use that term, preferring instead to use "documents."
73. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1966).
74. Exec. Order No. 10.501, 3 CFR 292 (1970).

that the court should cling to a position which has been abandoned
by the very branch of government it seeks to protect.
By rejecting the former Executive Order, 75 the executive branch
has moved toward the position that the Congressional act mandated
only the classification of matters, not documents. That policy must
now be applied to those cases and conflicts which require judicial
interpretation. This is the proper sphere of judicial interventionto determine whether the executive has correctly separated the
various matters within a document according to their classification.
Regrettably, under the ruling such a logical approach has been rejected. According to the decision, a court could not question the
classification of an encyclopedia should an executive official decide
to make it secret.7

6

As long as the official quoted an Executive

Order as authority for his actions the court would be permitted
to intrude no further. There would be no in camera examination
of the document to determine whether discretion had been abused.
The official could merely file an affidavit that "The President has
signed an Executive Order classifying the encyclopedia as Top
Secret," and there would be no way for a private citizen to
challenge the action under the laws of the United States.
Judicial acceptance of responsibility to perform in camera inspections under the de novo procedures prescribed by the Act would
not alter the executive's power to classify-it would only permit
the disclosure of non-secret material. On the other hand, the Act
does not prohibit the courts from questioning the classification as
well. Certainly the courts have the ability and judgment necessary
to determine whether matters impinge on the national defense or
foreign policy. If there is a question, evidence could be taken in
chambers supporting the government's contention. The important
principle is that an independent party, the judiciary, would "keep
the executive honest" by being available to citizens who felt that
their right to information had been unfairly denied. Under present
circumstances, as under the old law which Congress replaced
apparently without effect, 77 no such redress is available.

The

efforts of Congress to fashion a suitable remedy have been brushed
aside by the Court. The judiciary will not even determine whether
78
the executive has classified properly.
75. Id.
76. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81-84 (1973), Justice White announced
the standard to be used: "Rather than some vague standard, the test was
to be simply whether the President has determined by Executive Order that
particular documents are to be kept secret." See contra: Eastern v. Resor,
421 F.2d 930 (1970).

77. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1946).
78. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 82 (1973).
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ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT

Matters that are "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
[sic] or letters which would not be available by law to a party
other than an agency
in litigation with the agency" are exempt
79
from disclosure.

It was asserted that three unclassified documents as well as the
classified documents fell within the inter-agency memorandum
exemption quoted above.8 0 The majority opinion found that the
exemption contemplated the use of discovery principles to determine whether information could be disclosed. It noted that such
a test was difficult to apply since the Act does not contemplate
inquiry into the particularized needs of the party seeking the information.8' Yet discovery law always makes such an inquiry-this
observation has been made by many writers. Discovery cases often
require in camera inspection. Thus, the Supreme Court permitted
in camera inspection of documents claimed to be exempt as interagency memoranda. In camera inspection is not automatic, however.
The agency may show by other means short of in camera inspection-oral testimony or affidavit-that all information sought is
exempt. The case was remanded to the District Court for consideration of that issue.8 2 The opinion reaffirmed the deliberative factual distinction applied by other courts, holding that factual
material is not exempt by this proviso from the Act's disclosure requirements.
While the remand on the subsection (b) (5) issue was perhaps

more realistic than the wholesale obliteration of subsection (b) (1),
it was of little practical value to a meaningful construction of the
Act. The majority opinion accepted the basic premise of the
Appeals Court decision,8 3 that the District Court should order disclosure of only factual material which is not "intertwined with
policy-making processes"8' 4 and may safely be disclosed "without
impinging on the policy-making decisional processes intended to be
protected by this exemption."8 5 The only reservation of the major79. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1966).
80. See nn. 3 and 4 in E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) for listing of
documents and classifications.
81. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85 (1973).
82. Id. at 93.

83. Mink v. E.P.A., 464 F.2d 742 (1972).
84. Id. at 746.
85. Id. at 747.

ity was the Appeals Court mandate of in ,camera inspection. .Apparently, this was deemed too arduous a chore to require of a court
every time "any member of the public" chose to challenge an
agency's right to withhold information. So the Supreme Court
directed that, on remand, the government might establish by some
means short of such an examination that it was entitled to withhold documents or portions thereof.8 6
This portion of the decision seems to encourage lower courts to
perform their assigned function under the Act with as little overt
involvement as possible. As much as possible should be left to the
executive branch. That branch can determine for itself which
portions of documents-or matters-are factual and must therefore
be disclosed. (Factual matter may be withheld under the first or
other exemptions but not under the advice exemption.) The executive then could merely submit an affidavit to the court for its acceptance. In so doing, the court would be blindly relying on executive action. There would be no positive, independent review. In the
Mink case, the Appeals Court 87 evidently felt that the subject was
sufficiently important to require court scrutiny of the documents
in question. This did not mean that for other matters, in other
cases, courts could not choose other means of determining the
extent of executive compliance with the requirements of the Act.
But by going out of its way to reject such a requirement, the
majority minimized the importance of true judicial involvement and
encouraged future decisions in lower courts based on such a
lackadaisical interpretation. 8
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion8 9 did not discuss this exemption; Justice Brennan expressly concurred with the majority
on this point.9 0 Justice Douglas did not discuss the exemption in
any detail, although he expressly agreed with the deliberation fact
distinction." Since he would have affirmed the Court of Appeals
opinion, however, Justice Douglas probably disagreed with the
majority's use of affidavits and oral testimony to preclude in camera
inspection.
COURT REsPoNsiBLITY-How GREAT?
The court shall determine the matter
de novo and the burden is
on the agency to sustain its action. 92
86. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973).
87. Mink v. E.P.A., 464 F.2d 742 (1972).
88. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91-92 (1973).
89. Id. at 94-95.

90. Id. at 95-105.
91. Id. at 105-111.

92. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1966).
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The majority opinion did not find it necessary to consider this
subsection at any length because of its conclusion as to the meaning
of the first exemption. It stated that plaintiffs met their burden
of proof under Section 152(a) (3) by showing that the documents
were classified. That showing meant that the documents were
exempt from disclosure. "(T)he duty of the District Court under
Section 522 (a) (3) was therefore at an end." 98
Justice Stewart's opinion specifically expands upon this holding
by the majority.
[T]he only 'matter' to be determined de novo under Section
[..
552(b) (1) is whether in fact the President has required by Executive Order that the documents in question are to be kept 9secret.
4
Under the Act as written, that is the end of a court's inquiry.
He expressly states that Justice Brennan's discussion of this subsection is an "admirably valiant effort to deflect the impact of this
rigid exemption."9 5 (Exemption 1).
Justice Brennan in dissent9 6 concluded that the de novo determination section applied to both exemptions.9 7 That section permits
the trial court to examine classified documents in camera to
determine whether there is material which might have been classified independently. The opinion quotes the House and Senate
Reports98 in reaching its conclusions.
Justice Douglas' dissent9 9 also relies heavily on Section 552
(a) (3). He concludes that the section authorizes the court to inspect the documents to assure that the Congressional policy of disclosure is carried out. It does not mean that the trial judge would
reclassify the document. It means that the court could examine
the material to determine if it were an appendage to the security
classification. 100 In this writer's view, however, nothing in the
93. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973).
94. Id. at 95.
95. Id.

96. Id. at 95-105.
97. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1966). This section relating to burden of proof applies to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) which is
the national security exemption and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) which is the intra
and inter-agency exemption.
98. Supra, note 48.
99. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973).
100. Id. at 109.

Act precludes a judicial decision on whether material is properly
classified in the first instance.
The split of the court 1° ' clearly indicates uncertainty as to the
application of the Freedom of Information Act, 10 2 particularly
with regard to the first exemption. 10 3 On that point the Court
split 5-3. The majority was reluctant to inspect classified documents without a clearer mandate to do so from Congress. With
regard to exemption 5,104 the court split 7-1, with only Justice
Douglas dissenting as to the use of oral testimony and affidavits
in lieu of in camera inspection.
Clearly, there is much division within the court on the crucial
issue of the first exemption. Nevertheless, an opinion has been
rendered which to all intents and purposes repeals a major segment
of the Act. In effect, Congress is told to do a better drafting job
if it expects the courts to shoulder a larger part of the responsibility
of providing citizens with the information they need to help govern
in a democracy. This is a tragic result of what I feel is an erroneous
interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act. 0 5 The Act
was carefully drawn in order to produce a workable and enforceable
mechanism for freedom of information and contained a remarkable
set of checks and balances. The only revisions previously thought
necessary arose because of executive recalcitrance in complying
with Congressional intent and involved various proposed tightenings of the exemptions.
Congress has moved toward strengthening of the Freedom of Information Act' 06 through new amendments drafted in light of the
court decision. H.R. 12471.107
The amendments provide for
changes in the Act, two of which were expressly designed to correct
the Mink decision. One clarified the authority of courts over executive branch claims of secrecy by amending the section of the Act
dealing with judicial review of withheld materials. It inserted
language to the effect that the courts "may examine the contents
of any agency records in camera to determine whether such records
101. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, and was joined by

Justices Burger, Stewart, Blackmun and Powell.

Justice Stewart filed a

concurring opinion; Justice Brennan an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice Douglas filed a
dissent and Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
102. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
103. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1966).

104. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1966).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
106. Id.

107. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions
set forth'10 8 in the Act. Such a change would remove all doubt
that the courts have discretionary authority to utilize in camera
inspections when they believe it is desirable.
The other change of H.R. 12471109 stemming from the Mink
decision revised the wording of Exemption 1 relating to national
security. Instead of referring merely to matters specifically required 'by Executive Order to be kept secret, it would exempt
matters "authorized under criteria established by an Executive
Order" to be kept secret. 110 This would give courts leeway to
examine the justification of the classification itself. It would
empower courts to determine whether the matters meet the criteria
established by the Executive Order under which they were withheld. The executive branch would be unable to withhold information purely because it was embarrassing or politically sensitive or
otherwise concealed for improper purposes.
While the Congress seems willing to recognize that certain
changes are needed in the Act, the executive branch remains
unwilling to accept any inroads which would limit executive power.
In one of his first acts as head of the executive branch, President
Ford chose to veto the amendments to the Act, calling H.R. 12471
"unconstitutional, unworkable and a threat to American intelligence
secrets and diplomatic relations."''
In his veto message, the
President noted that provisions of the bill would allow for court
de-classification without expertise on the matters involved. The
President additionally saw the provisions as permitting the court
1 2
to make initial classifications rather than mere inspection.
In his message to Congress, the President said he was willing to
accept a provision for court examination and review as regards the
justification of the classified status, however he proposed that the
classification be upheld by the courts if there appears to be any
13
rational basis for it.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.

111. Jules Witeover, Freedom of Information Measure Vetoed by Ford
as Peril to Nation,Los Angeles Times, Oct. 18, 1974, at A-13, col. 1.
112. Id. at col. 2.
113. Id. at col. 3.

The amendments had overwhelming support in the Congress,1 14
and many proponents of the bill viewed the presidential veto as
directly contrary to the President's promise for an "open government." This support was further evidenced by Congressional override of the veto. The bill as voted on by Congress establishes a 10day limit for agencies to decide on whether or not to provide information, a 20-day limit on deciding administrative appeals and a 30day limit on governmental replies to lawsuits. In addition to the
power given federal judges to decide upon whether a document
should be made public, it requires the indexing of documents available to the public.1 15
Despite the setbacks in the Mink decision requiring legislative
redress to achieve the original purposes of the Freedom of Information Act," 6 the decision did serve to establish the principle of
judicial in camera inspections of executive branch documents.
Although the Supreme Court held that such inspections are not
allowed in cases where information is kept secret because of the
first exemption of the Act, 11 it did hold that inspections could
be performed under certain conditions for material withheld under
all other exemptions. 118 This holding that de novo review authority as provided for in the Act allows an in camera inspection
was cited in the case of Nixon v. Sirica, 119 U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, decided on October 12,1973.
The Nixon case involved a request by Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox for taped Presidential conversations in the political
scandal known as "Watergate." U. S. District Judge John Sirica
ruled that he would listen to the tapes in chambers to determine
whether the tapes or portions of them should be released to the
Special Prosecutor for use in his legal cases against presidential
aides and others. President Nixon appealed the decision, 20 contending that Judge Sirica had exceeded his authority in ordering
an in camera inspection of the tapes. The Court of Appeals (Case
Number 73-1989)12 1 upheld Judge Sirica's decision, with slight
modifications, leaning heavily on the Supreme Court decision in
Mink as precedent. Chief Judge Bazelon, in the court's opinion,
wrote:
114. NoTE: The House passed the final conference version of the bill on
October 7, 1974, by 349 to 2, while the Senate version was passed May 30,
1974, by 64 to 17.
115. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 22, 1974, at A-l, Col. 5.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1966).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2-9) (1966).
119. 487 F.2d 700 (1973).
120. In Re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (1973).
121. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (1973).
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...
Mink confirms that courts appropriately examine a disputed
item in camera, even though this necessarily involves a limited
intrusion upon what ultimately may be held confidential, where it
appears with reasonable clarity that some access is appropriate, and
in camera inspection is needed
to determine what should and what
should not be revealed.1 22

President Nixon chose not to appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court, which had already'-upheld compelled disclosure to a court
in the Mink case. 123 The tapes were turned over to the Special
Prosecutor and a federal grand jury, which ultimately dispatched
its findings to the U.S. House of Representatives for use in impeach-

ment proceedings against the President.
In a later case involving Watergate tapes the President did appeal
disclosure to the Supreme Court, and his position was rejected
resoundingly. 124 The President then personally listened to the
tapes, and, after issuing a public statement thereon, shortly submitted his resignation.
The resignation exemplified the power of information. It also
highlighted the importance of making the Freedom of Information
Act

25

a viable and functioning mechanism for maintaining a free

flow of governmental information to the people. Only in this way
can the ability of the people to govern be preserved.

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 720.
E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
U.S. v. Nixon, 42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (July 27, 1974).
5 U.S.C. § 552.

